Jean-Pierre

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RFD D12: Large Attachment Size Policy ​

Summary ​

This RFD introduces a configurable size policy for attachments. When the total resolved attachment content exceeds a configurable threshold, JP applies a policy: prompt the user for confirmation (with options to attach as-is, truncate, or cancel), auto-truncate, allow unconditionally, or reject. The policy composes with non-interactive mode — when no TTY is available, the configured policy replaces the interactive prompt.

Motivation ​

Attachments are resolved lazily. The Handler::add() method records a URI; the actual content is fetched later by Handler::get() at query time. For glob patterns, a single file://src/**/*.rs attachment can expand to hundreds of files. For HTTP attachments, the response body size is unknown until fetched.

Today, the only size guard is a 10 MiB hard limit on individual binary files in the file handler (MAX_BINARY_SIZE). Text files have no size check at all. A user can accidentally attach a large directory tree or a verbose command output and send hundreds of thousands of tokens to the LLM without any warning.

This wastes tokens and money, can exceed provider context windows (causing cryptic API errors), and degrades response quality when the context is dominated by irrelevant content.

Users need a way to:

  • Get warned before sending unexpectedly large attachments.
  • Truncate oversized content without manually editing the attachment.
  • Configure the behavior for scripted/non-interactive use.

Design ​

User Experience ​

When a user runs jp query --attach src/ and the resolved content exceeds the configured threshold, they see:

⚠ Attachments total 847 KB (threshold: 512 KB)

  src/**/*.rs  — 127 files, 623 KB
  Cargo.lock   — 224 KB

Attach large content? [y,t,n,?]?
  • y — attach as-is, proceed with the query.
  • t — truncate each text attachment to truncate_to bytes (default: half the threshold), then proceed.
  • n — cancel the query.
  • ? — print help.

Binary attachments are not truncatable. If the total binary content alone exceeds the threshold and the user picks t, only text content is truncated; binary content is kept as-is. A future iteration could offer to drop specific binary attachments, but that is out of scope here.

Configuration ​

New fields under conversation.attachment:

toml
[conversation.attachment]
# Total byte size across all resolved attachments that triggers the policy.
# Accepts human-readable sizes: "512KB", "1MB", "2MB".
# Default: "512KB".
size_threshold = "512KB"

# What to do when the threshold is exceeded.
# Values: "ask", "allow", "truncate", "reject".
# Default: "ask".
size_policy = "ask"

# Target size per text attachment when truncating.
# Accepts human-readable sizes. Default: half of size_threshold.
# Only meaningful when size_policy is "ask" or "truncate".
truncate_to = "256KB"
PolicyTTY behaviorNon-TTY behavior
askInteractive promptAuto-approve (attach as-is)
allowNo promptNo prompt
truncateAuto-truncate silentlyAuto-truncate silently
rejectErrorError

The ask policy auto-approves when no TTY is present, matching the existing convention for permission prompts (see RFD 049).

Where the Check Happens ​

The check is a single function called in Query::run(), between attachment resolution and thread construction:

rust
// Resolve all attachment content (existing code).
let attachments: Vec<_> = futures::future::try_join_all(attachment_futs)
    .await?
    .into_iter()
    .flatten()
    .collect();

// NEW: apply the size policy.
let attachments = apply_attachment_size_policy(
    attachments,
    &cfg.conversation.attachment,
    ctx.term.is_tty,
    &ctx.printer,
)?;

// Build the thread (existing code).
let thread = build_thread(stream, attachments, &cfg.assistant, !tools.is_empty())?;

Content is already in memory at this point. This is deliberate — reliable size information is only available after fetch. The cost of fetching content that gets discarded is acceptable: file I/O is local and fast, HTTP attachments are uncommon and typically small, and command output is bounded by execution time.

The apply_attachment_size_policy Function ​

rust
fn apply_attachment_size_policy(
    attachments: Vec<Attachment>,
    config: &AttachmentSizeConfig,
    is_tty: bool,
    printer: &Printer,
) -> Result<Vec<Attachment>> {
    let total = attachment_byte_size(&attachments);
    if total <= config.size_threshold {
        return Ok(attachments);
    }

    match config.size_policy {
        SizePolicy::Allow => Ok(attachments),
        SizePolicy::Reject => Err(Error::AttachmentTooLarge { total, threshold: config.size_threshold }),
        SizePolicy::Truncate => Ok(truncate_attachments(attachments, config.truncate_to)),
        SizePolicy::Ask if !is_tty => Ok(attachments),
        SizePolicy::Ask => prompt_attachment_size(attachments, config, total, printer),
    }
}

Size Calculation ​

A byte_size() method is added to Attachment:

rust
impl Attachment {
    pub fn byte_size(&self) -> usize {
        match &self.content {
            AttachmentContent::Text(s) => s.len(),
            AttachmentContent::Binary { data, .. } => data.len(),
        }
    }
}

Total size sums all attachments. The threshold comparison uses raw byte size, not token estimates. Byte size is deterministic, fast to compute, and handler-agnostic. Token estimation would require a tokenizer dependency and varies by model.

Truncation ​

Text attachments are truncated to truncate_to bytes, aligned to the nearest UTF-8 character boundary. A marker is appended:

... [truncated, 623 KB → 256 KB]

Binary attachments are never truncated. Truncating an image or PDF produces corrupt data.

When multiple text attachments are present, each is truncated independently to truncate_to bytes. This is simpler than proportional allocation and avoids penalizing small attachments. The total post-truncation size may still exceed the threshold if there are many attachments; this is acceptable — the goal is a reasonable reduction, not a hard cap.

Prompt Rendering ​

The warning message groups attachments by source with size annotations. This gives the user enough context to decide:

⚠ Attachments total 847 KB (threshold: 512 KB)

  src/**/*.rs  — 127 files, 623 KB
  Cargo.lock   — 224 KB

Attach large content? [y,t,n,?]?

For glob-expanded attachments, the display groups by the original pattern (the source field on Attachment). Individual file names within a glob are not listed — the count and aggregate size are sufficient.

The prompt uses the existing InlineSelect component from jp_inquire.

Drawbacks ​

  • Post-fetch check: Content is fully loaded into memory before the size check runs. For extremely large attachments (e.g. a multi-gigabyte directory tree), this means the memory is allocated and then potentially discarded. In practice this is unlikely — the file handler already skips binary files over 10 MiB, and text files large enough to cause memory pressure are rare.

  • Byte size ≠ token cost: The threshold is in bytes, not tokens. A 512 KB file is roughly 128K–170K tokens depending on content and tokenizer. Users who think in tokens need to mentally convert. This is a deliberate trade-off: byte size is handler-agnostic and doesn't require a tokenizer dependency.

  • Per-attachment truncation: Each text attachment is truncated independently to the same limit. If a query has 20 small files and one large file, all get the same truncate_to budget. Proportional allocation would be fairer but adds complexity for marginal benefit.

Alternatives ​

Inline post-fetch check without configuration ​

A hardcoded threshold and prompt in Query::run() with no config surface. This is the minimal version of the proposal.

Rejected because it doesn't compose with non-interactive mode and gives users no way to tune the threshold for their workflow. A user attaching large codebases for code review has different needs than one attaching a single file.

Two-phase handler protocol (preflight → get) ​

Add a preflight() method to the Handler trait that returns estimated content size before fetching. The CLI prompts between preflight and fetch.

Rejected because:

  • It requires a breaking change to the Handler trait (all five handler implementations need updating).
  • Several handlers cannot estimate size (cmd output is unpredictable, MCP resources have no size metadata).
  • Glob expansion in the file handler would need to run twice (once for estimation, once for content).
  • The marginal benefit (avoiding fetch of discarded content) doesn't justify the complexity. File I/O is fast and HTTP attachments are uncommon.

Token-based threshold ​

Use estimated token count instead of byte size. This would align the threshold with the resource that actually matters (context window tokens).

Rejected because token estimation requires a tokenizer dependency, varies by model, and is slow for large content. Byte size is a reasonable proxy — the relationship between bytes and tokens is roughly linear for text content.

Non-Goals ​

  • Per-attachment policies: This RFD applies a single policy to the aggregate size of all attachments. Per-attachment thresholds or per-handler policies are future work.

  • Smart truncation: Truncation is a simple byte cut. Content-aware truncation (e.g. keeping function signatures, removing method bodies) is out of scope.

  • Token budget management: Fitting attachments within a model's context window is a broader problem that involves the system prompt, conversation history, and tool definitions. This RFD addresses only the "surprisingly large attachment" case.

  • Binary attachment truncation or dropping: This RFD does not offer to drop or resize binary attachments. The prompt only truncates text content.

Risks and Open Questions ​

  • Default threshold value: 512 KB is a starting guess. It should be validated against real usage. Too low and users get prompted constantly; too high and the guard is ineffective. The value is configurable, so a wrong default is recoverable.

  • Glob grouping in the prompt: The prompt groups files by source. For glob patterns, all expanded files share the same source pattern. This works for file://src/**/*.rs but may be confusing if multiple glob patterns overlap. Needs validation with real glob-heavy workflows.

  • Interaction with RFD 065: The typed resource model may change how attachment content is represented. The size policy should work with whatever content type replaces AttachmentContent. The byte_size() method is simple enough to adapt.

  • Interaction with RFD 015: The simplified handler trait removes stateful add/remove/list. The size policy is independent of handler state — it operates on resolved Attachment values — so the two proposals are compatible.

Implementation Plan ​

Phase 1: Attachment::byte_size() and config types ​

Add the byte_size() method to Attachment in jp_attachment. Add AttachmentSizeConfig (threshold, policy, truncate_to) and SizePolicy enum to jp_config::conversation::attachment. Wire the new config fields into PartialConversationConfig.

Mergeable independently. No behavioral change.

Phase 2: Size policy function and truncation ​

Implement apply_attachment_size_policy() and truncate_attachments() in a new module jp_cli::cmd::attachment::size_policy. Unit tests for each policy mode and for truncation (UTF-8 boundary handling, binary passthrough, marker text).

Mergeable independently. The function exists but is not called yet.

Phase 3: Wire into Query::run() and add prompt ​

Call apply_attachment_size_policy() in Query::run() between attachment resolution and build_thread(). Add the InlineSelect prompt for the ask policy. Add integration-level tests with MockPromptBackend.

Depends on phases 1 and 2.

References ​